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It was Taney's misfortune to be Chief Justice when the
slavery issue, many times postponed, came to the boiling point.
His liberal views, his valuable contribution to the vexing prob-
lems of division of powers between state and nation have all
been overlooked in the torrent of abuse that followed in the
wake of the unfortunate Dred Scott decision.7
Chief Justice Hughes at the unveiling of a bust of Taney at
Frederick in 1931 gave distinguished if tardy recognition to
the character and learning of Taney, who had so long been
misunderstood:
"With the passing of the years and the softening of old asperities,
the arduous service nobly rendered by Roger Brooke Taney has re-
ceived its fitting recognition. He bore his wounds with the fortitude
of an invincible spirit. He was a great Chief Justice."
As a political interpretation of the tempestuous times ante-
dating the Civil War, this volume is excellent and worthy of the
finest traditions of American scholarship. Its treatment of the
judicial career of Taney fails to attain the high stk-ndard of the
earlier part of the volume dealing with his political experience,
but nevertheless, Professor Swisher has made many valuable
contributions for the student of our constitutional history. This
volume will do much to substantiate the judgment of Chief
Justice Hughes.
JOHN J. BURNS.*
ROGER B. TANEY: JACKSONIAN JURIST-by Charles W. Smith, Jr.
The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1936. Pp. xi,
242.
Rehabilitation of Taney's reputation would seem to be com-
plete when more than a century and a half after his birth two
substantial books devoted to his life and works can appear
simultaneously and achieve popular appeal. The two books are
complementary. Swisher's is a full-length biography, giving
adequate, even preferred, space to Taney's political career, par-
ticularly his dramatic struggle, as Secretary of the Treasury
and adviser to Jackson, with the second Bank of the United
States. The present monograph treats biographical details only
7 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).
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summarily, and is restricted almost entirely to consideration of
Taney's basic philosophical ideas.
There is much about Taney which should appeal, even carry
its lesson, to us of the present day. If we apply modern labels,
Taney was a great liberal judge. As such he had almost all the
virtues of the great jurist and only perhaps to a limited extent
the vices, if those things be vices which brought his illustrious
predecessor, Marshall, eternal and abiding fame. And yet he is
chiefly known and has been derided and contemned for the lat-
ter, only lately and tardily respected for the former. At a
crucial time he and his colleagues tried to assume leadership
in the solution of grave social and political problems. They
failed because the country was not willing to abide juridical
settlement of such issues. And so the Dred Scott case has come
to be a synonym for judicial error, though it is but the logical
outcome of what, through tradition now settled, we expect and
must accept from our judges.
We are prone nevertheless to forget Taney's real contribu-
tions to law and government. He came to the Court at a time
when democratic principles were regaining sway of men's minds
and he furthered the trend away from interferences with legis-
lative activities. To do this he had to break some of the shackles
forged by the great Marshall. Almost his first judicial act was
his opinion in the Charles River Bridge case,1 limiting the theory
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 2 (that a corporate franchise
was an imperishable contract) to the holding that the legisla-
ture could not be considered to have bartered away the public
rights in perpetuity unless it had said so expressly. This deci-
sion, condemned by Story and Kent, was, it is now admitted,
absolutely essential, not merely for the development of orderly
governmental processes, but also for the advancement of indus-
try, if it were not to be kept in straitjackets set by early mo-
nopoly grants. Taney developed also the idea of state police
power as an attribute of sovereignty which limited property
rights and which could not be bargained away. He stood for
the rights of men against government in war time; he estab-
lished a workable view of interstate commerce which would
allow scope for proper state regulation not in opposition to fed-
eral control; and he asserted the supremacy of the national
government against state nullification. He believed in the oper-
I Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (1837).
2 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (181).
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ation of true democratic principles, with the people -as ultimate
ruler. He also upheld a national government as well as the
rights of man, and the fears he expressed lest the country be
dominated by large money interests might have been stated by
either the elder or the later Roosevelt. In short had he not
yielded to a desire, made wholly natural by our governmental
set-up, of playing divinity in the r6le of judge, his fame would
doubtless be secure.
Yet in a way Taney came to assume the Messianic r6le by
chance. As is well known, the Court's first view was that the
decision in the Dred Scott case 3 should be limited to procedural
issues. But a dissenting judge-a perpetual candidate for the
presidency for over a quarter of a century-announced his pur-
pose to make a full statement of views on slavery and the re-
lation of South and North. So all the justices decided to settle
once and for all these burning problems, and put the country
at rest about them, even though the narrow judicial issues did
not require it, So likewise have later justices felt that forth-
right pronouncements might settle disputes more weighty than
those merely before the Court. Such at least has been contem-
porary criticism of the Schechter case,4 the Railroad Retirement
Act case,5 or the TVA case.6 If one could eliminate the burning
moral issues which had gotten inextricably woven into the
problems of slavery and nullification, what the majority did in
the Dred Scott case would not seem so strange. For they as-
serted the power of the national government through the Court
to preserve the economic institution upon which they believed
Southern prosperity to depend, until it was properly abolished
by the people themselves. Taney always asserted the right of
the people to change their form of government as set forth in
the Constitution; nowhere does he make any appeal to any
natural law, higher than that declared by the people. And the
interpretation of the Constitution as protecting one important
form of property was in the best Marshallian tradition.
As prophets, too, the justices of 1857 were not so far wrong.
For the harsh way finally chosen to uproot slavery did destroy
the civilization of the South and forced its rebuilding after long
years of pain and anguish. Could slavery have been abolished
3 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857).
4 Schechter v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
5 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
6 Ashwander et al. v. Tennessee Valley Authority et al., No. 403-4, Oct.
Term, 1935, decided February 17, 1936.
19361 1053
GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
in some more tempered way, the South might well have reached
an economic adjustment to its abolition without the tragic ruin
and desolation which it has had to suffer. The only thing the
justices did not foresee was that in the long run judges will not
and cannot be accepted as arbiters of the political destiny of
nations.
The present volume, devoted as it is to an exposition of
Taney's views, very well brings out many of the attributes of
Taney's faith referred to above-his devotion to popular sov-
ereignty and the democratic principle, his protection of the
legislative power in general, his support of the rights of men.
Taken with Swisher's longer biography, it affords an adequate
picture of a real personage, interesting not merely because of
the historic part he has played in our history, but also for a
kind of obstinate and unflinching courage, having no regard for
consequences, which betokens respect, if not affection. It is
true that the book by itself gives only a half view, for a man's
whole life and environment are of the utmost importance in
considering his views as judge. Taney's Maryland background,
leading up to his struggle with the Bank of United States, had
a shaping influence on his career, and he never deviated from
the views he early acquired. One understands his philosophy
best in the light of this personal history. Thus the book runs
some danger of falling between the two stools of the short crit-
ical essay and the extended biography. There is a considerable
repetition of ideas, and even of specific quotations, as of Bran-
deis' recent use of Taney's language, in the several chapters.
One sees a danger, too, in attempting to develop too rounded a
philosophy from the mosaic of various judicial opinion. Thus
the author, relying on Taney's solicitude lest state legislative
power should be restricted, suggests that Taney might well have
agreed with the later decision banning Congressional action
against child labor. It seems to me the odds are rather the
other way, for Taney supported the national power and only
upheld state acts as filling gaps left in federal regulation of
interstate commerce.
Notwithstanding some such doubts as to the complete suc-
cess with which the author has accomplished his objective, one
can well be grateful to him for demonstrating once again the
paradoxes which under our governmental scheme our greatest
judges present. The bitter tumult which followed the Dred
Scott case seems to us but the echoes of a distant past. Is it,
however? This morning I opened my newspaper to read the
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remarks of a prominent industrialist that there was wanting
only court approval of the basic TVA, the Soil Conservation
Act, the Guffey Coal Bill, and the Social Security Act to pave
the way to Socialism and Communism on the one hand and
Fascism and Nazism on the other. Today many vocal people
still look to the Court for leadership almost divine. History
may demonstrate that a people cannot be driven into but must
achieve righteousness; and yet it is only human to yield to so
noble a call to duty. One can only urge, however, that the
criticisms brought upon the Court have been of its own seeking,
that its real greatness is shown most by judicial restraint from
advancing into fields too far distant from the adjudication of
the rights between man and man, and that a true respect for
the Court lies in reiteration of these principles.
CHARLES E. CLARK.*
THE CATHOLIC TRADITION OF THE LAW OF NATIONS-by John
Eppstein. Prepared under the auspices of the Catholic Council for
International Relations and published for the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace by Burns Oates & Washbourne Ltd., London,
1936. Pp. 525.
It is a difficult and frying and, as the reader will doubtless
see, an impossible task to write an adequate review of John
Eppstein's Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations. Neither
the publisher in his statement to the general public nor the re-
viewer in his statement to a more restricted public can fully set
forth the reasons why this volume should be on the desk of the
historian, of the theologian and of the advocates of an accepta-
ble law of nations. The only way to appreciate its value not only
for 'today but for tomorrow and for the future is to read the
book from beginning to end and to ponder it well, for between
its covers lies what should be the international law of the fu-
ture, if law is to be looked upon as a moral and spiritual concept
instead of a brutal command.
The title of the work indicates its scope and its content.
The Catholic tradition is a long one, and the law of nations,
like the Catholic tradition, is universal. This mere statement
reveals the difficulty which a reviewer has in dwelling in detail
upon the various phases covered by Mr. Eppstein in his admi-
rable treatise.
*Dean and Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University School of Law.
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